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THE  ENERGY  CRISIS 
The  events  of  the  last  51X  mdntlls  have  been  traumatic 
indeed  for the  industrialised Western  World.  Now  it  seems 
that  our  future  wei 1-being  1s  threatened  more  imrnediately 
by  the  policies of  otl1ers,  with  some  of  whom  we  have  very 
I imited  influence  o~ even  understandi~g - and  no  longer 
by  the  iron  laws  of  econoly,  from  whose  grio  ~oney and 
.scientific  com~unity stood  ready  and  eager  to  deliver  us. 
Above  alI,  for  Western  Europe  and  Jaoan.  The  brutal 
truth  is  that  imported  oi I  has  become  t~1e  very  foundation  . 
of  ~urope's prosperity  for  the  foreseeable  future.  For  the 
next  fifteen  to  twenty  years,  we  may  expect  Europe's  dependanc9 
on  this or  some  external  source  (such  as  imported  coal)  to 
. increase  not  dimini$h.  Even  in  1971,  impor~ed oil  provided 
62  % of Western  Europe's  energy,  and  59  ~of that of the 
Community  of  n1ne.  By  1985,  that  figure  was  projected to  rise 
to  some  7J  ~of Community  needs. 
This  dependance  gew  out  of the  flood  of  cheap  and 
plentiful  energy_ provided for  us  by  tl1e  oi I  companies.  We 
took  the  easy  road  they  offered towards  an  economy  bui It  on 
a  wasteful  squandering  of the  world's  oi I  resources  and 
neglected  other  sources  of  energy  tl1at  appeared  more  costly. 
AI  I  this  is  now  wei  I  known,  hut  we·cannot  change  direction 
easily.  ~evere shortages  of  oi I  wi  II  mean  many  difficult  years 
•.• /of  adjust~ent, 
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of  adjustment:,  \oJit::h  gt'nvc  socini  and  econornrc  problems.  There 
is  no  subst i tutn  for  i rnpoPted  o i I  1 n  thH  shot't  term.  1 .'/h i I e 
self-sufficiency  is  n  possibi I ity for  the  IJSA,  but  only  with 
difficulty and  nt  immense  financial  cost.  For  Eliropc  S\Jch 
independancc  is  inconceiva~le  in  the  foreseeable  future. 
This  means  that  Europe  is  comr;~ i tted to  purchc1s i ng  a 
major  part  of  its energy  needs  of  the  World's  market:~ It  is 
com~itted to  the  future  of  international  trade  and  its proper 
conduct.  And  it  means  that  Europe's  economic  destiny  is  tied 
to  the  specific actions  of  the  quite  I i:11ited  n1rnber  of 
countries  \oJho  cleterm i ne  the  evo I uti on  of the  1"or I d  •nar!;;et  1 n 
ener-gy. 
In  the  world  market  for  oi I  the  numher  of  major  parti-
cipants  is  quite  smal I.  So  far  as  Europe  IS  concerned  a  smal I 
number  of  Arab  States orovide  73  ·~~of  our  total  oi I  import 
requirements. 
But  the  conditions  under  which  we  obtain that  oi I  are 
al~o determined  by  the  actions  of the  two  other major  consumers-
Japan  and  th~  USA.  The  USA  is  of  spec  i a I  interest  because  her 
import  pol icy  IS  an  option  - at  a  price the  USA  has  tm:11ense 
resources  of  oi I  and  coal  to  develop- at  a  price,  the  U~A  could 
make  substantial  economies  in  her  use  of  energy.  Japan,  I ike 
Europe,  has  far  less  of  a  margin  for  econo~ies  in  the  use  of  oi I 
witho~t severe  economic  and  social  repercussions. 
The  Ori~ins of  the  Present  Crisis 
This  quick  review  enables  us  to  trt~ce the  ortgtns of  the 
present  cr1s1s  quite easily.  First,  !J<::;A  import  pol1cy  and  the  . 
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finunciol  incentives  cd;  \vork  for•  thrJ  :11<1jor  oi'l  colt10<H11•.;;~  IH1vo 
r-csul ted  in  a  modnst  dec I i ne  in  ll. ~.  do:nust i c  pl'oduct ion  c)f 
c t' u d  0  ,  \v i t h  t: h  o  g I" o  1.,r t h  i 11  de  tYH1 n d  be i n g  (: n ken  u p  b >'  i rn p o t• t s 
fro:n  ArHb  Stc1tes1  and  From  Suudi  Art:~bin  in  p.:~r~t:icular. 
The  second  factor·  has  been  the  gro1-1 r n9  ab i I i ty  of  t~e 
governments  of  oil-produciAO  countries to  determine  sucply 
con d i t  i on s  t h c ·n s e I v e s 1  so  rn e t h i n g  \v h i c h  w  a s  p P e v i o u s I y  a 
ViPtunlly  exclusive  dorne'lin  of  the  oil  companies.  The  f<1ct 
i s  t hat  t h o  !\ rub  S t a t e s  a r~ e  no  v,r  \V e I I  awn r e  of  t he  s t.r  en 9th  of 
~ 
their~  bnrgaining  position  an<i  cleor-ly  possess  the  skills as  wei 
the  motivation  to  use  it forcefully.  For  111any  of  these  countries, 
the  revenues  enrned  from  oi I  nre  the  srne  qua  non  of their 
dcv(dopment.  Well  nwnre  of theiP  I imited  I ife,  they  hnve  made 
it quite  clenp  thut  they  wish  to  stretch  the~ out  as  long  AS 
possible  1vhi  le  n:axirnising  their  revenues  by  rnaint<'li ning  the 
prcss~re for  higher  prices. 
\
1!e  can  say  thut  the  o i I  producers  h<1ve  stepped  in  and 
dealt  \vith  the  world's  reckless  squandering  of  its  oi I  resources 
1 n  the r O\Vn  \.Jay,  in  the  absence  of  any  rea I  interest  or action 
by  the  govern~ents of the  consuming  countries.  Their  initi~tive 
ts  here  to  stay  and  wi  I I  be  an  essential  consideration  from  now 
on  tn  any  redrawing  of the  bnlance  of our  energy  sources. 
The  major  oi I  companres  have  been  quite  unnble  to  prevent 
their control  over  the  price  nnd  quantity  of  oi I  offered  in  the 
nw rket  being  c rorled  by  the  member  govern•nent s  of  0 P EC.  It  h<1 s 
!)ecome  apparent  that,  in  many  wuys,  the  co:11pan i es'  interests 
lay  more  in  apoeasing  producing  states  - nl I  the  more  stnce 
the  governments  of  most  consu11ing  countries  continued to 
ac-f:ively  <woid  any  direct  involvement.  Gradually,  the  companies 
have  hccorne,  as  Professor  Adelm<'ln  of theM. I .T.  so  vividly 
describES them,  - tnx  co I I ectors for  the  Of'EC governments . 
••• /Thus the  pol iticisntion 4
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T  h  u s  t h c  p o I i i: i c i s u t i o n  o F  o i I  p ,·, o c n e do  d  l1 fH1 c e ,  o  n d  t h c 
evcnf:s  Folloh•_ing  on  tho  '(om  :<iopuP  wnt'  finfll ly  confr•ont.od 
consui!H.~P  ~1nvcrnrn~nts  ,_,;  t:h  il  r~cill ity  1o~hich  ,..,,,s  in(•!;c£lp~hlc~. 
Eut'Opc  ttnd  J<ip<ln  found  i:he;nsel vcs  to  00  I itt  I c  rnot'e  th<lt 
anx i 011s  specb:d:ors  1 n  events  of  the  grcotest  s i 9n if  i cancc  for 
their- future·. 
The  economic  And  eol ~ticAl  co n s e t:ll 1 c n c e s  of this· uphe<lVfl I 
in  the  oi I  market  are  already  visible.  Fro~ the  econo~ic 
p o i n t  of  v i e '"  the  c t' i s i s  \v a s  v i e '" e d  i n  t he . be  9 i n n i n g  a s  fl  c a s e 
of  shortugcs.  Ho1vever,  as  the  s i tunt ion  became  !'llore  stab i I i zed, 
it  was  the  financial  and  monetar-y  aspects,  the queitions  of 
pr' ice  and  of  ba I Dnccs  of  pa yrne nt s  \.Jh  ich  cr~me  to  the  forefront. 
•  The  exoorting  countries  had  in  fact  at their disposal  enormous 
amounts  of  currencies  of  which  only  a  proportion  can  be  used 
at  home,  but  of  which  the  greater  part  wi  I i,  for  instance,  have 
to  be  mobi I ~zed for· productive  purposes  fa~ other  countries,  and 
an  oarticular for  the  developing  countries. 
The  risk  is  indeed  gr-eat  tlwt this addition  a I  vo I ume  of 
capital  wi  I I  further  aggravate  international  monetary  disorder 
and  lead  us  into  a  truly catastroohic situation. 
This  prospect,  which  is  alar~ing and  might  become  further 
aggravated  if  individual  States of  grouos  of  ~tates  were  to 
engage  in  <'~n  effort  of  outbidding  one  another  in  protectionism, 
partitionin9-off privi !edg~d. trading areas  or  economic  hegemonies. 
\•/ithout  being  unduly  pessill'fistic,  the  Co'TI:ni"ssion  forecasts 
that  the  year  1 i)?;J.  wi  II  be  a  di ffi cuI t  year  f0r  l:urope·3n  econ-
nornies  : 
- T  h  ~  r e  \v i I I  be  u  d c f  i n i t e  s I o  \v down  of  e con  o  n11 c  g r o  t-1 t h  \.J i t h 
••• /serious  structured 5 st~ Pi ou  !';  s 1:  t~u c t u t'<l I  <:tup I o y"m  n 1:  i f  1.Je  do  not  L·d._·.~  n d(HJU o t e 
111 e ;1  ~:>Ill' e H  i n  i;  h  e  n e •l r  f 11 t u I'  c • 
Finally,  thet·c  v.•i  II  be  scr'IOUS  pr,oblc•us  fop  ne•nber  '-'itt.ltes 
i n  cop i n n  '" i t: h  t h  o  <1 d d i U  on n I  h ·'" n n c e  o f  p n y  m  c n t  b u r d  c~ n s • 
T  h  e  D o I i (;  i c fl I  t'  (10 .:w c u s s i o n s  o f  1: h  c  o i I  c r- i s i s  c a n  I i '< e '" i s e 
.~-~  ...... --~··-·  ~~-··-·--......... -.--~----...--. 
discerenrl.  1•/c  <1Pe  '"it:nessjng  fl  shift of  l'esponsibi I ity  in  the 
field  of  oi I  supplies  since  ~t<1tes  must  to  so~e extent take 
the  pl<1ce  of  oi I  comn.-mies  in  ne!=)otiations  ,.,ith  the  producer 
<:;ounb·ies. 
N  0\v  t h e  I o s s  of  b  i1 r 0  <1  i n i n 9  p o h' e r  by  t he  rn C!.J  or~  o i I 
CO·llpdn i e s  hu s  I c ft  o  vu cuu:n  1<1h  i ch  governments  are  obI i ged  to 
fi II.  This  ne1"  responsibi I ity  has  become  unavoidable,  and 
from  now  on  it  wi  I I  be  normal  for  governme~ts to  be  closely 
concerned  in  these  matters. 
Certain I y  for  Europe  ns  <J  who I e  to  estnb I ish  its presence 
and  potentia I  contr· i but ion  mo1~e  effective! y,  1  n  the  course  of 
these  negotintions  ~ith  oi !-producers,  can  ~nly be  desir~ble. 
I f  i n de e d  E  u r ,) p e ' s  f P i e n d s h i_ p  \v e t' e  to  p  e co  '11 e  a s  v a I u e d  i1 'TJO n g s t 
oi !-producers as theirs  is  amongst  us,  <J  better equi I ibrium 
would  be  achieved. 
However',  alI  the  measures  that  the  Stntes are  taking  at 
present,  though  they  E>re  characteristic of  the  disarray  in 
which  we  find  ourselves,  can  only  be  pal I iatives,  and  do  not 
in  fact  present  anything  more  than  partial  solutions. 
I  think  it  is  now  clear to  alI  thot  while  bilateral  deals 
have  thS'! i i'  pI ace  and  may  provide  temporary  udvantuges,  a I I  the 
evidence  is  thnt  the  overall  churacter  of  the  mc1rkct  wi  II 
quick I y  rei ,nposc  i tse If  if there  1  s  any  substant i ol  di vet'gence 
at  least,  thnt  is,  divergence  1n  fovour  of  one  or  another 
con~u'11ing  country. 
• .• /In principle then, 6
\ 
; 
In  principlo  then,  nil  OP<!l  H£JPeed  that;  such  bi l'1tcrol 
den It'>  .;ls  ore  rrwdn  should  be  in  the  contcxf;  of  a  frnmm</ot~', 
of  rtlles  for  the  conduct  of  intcrnntionnl  trodc  relations 
<-lppl  i~rtblc to  t~ll.  The  fH'csent  fr•wne\•/OI"k  is  obviously  inadequate, 
another  11ust  be  cret~ted. 
Otherwise  we  are  f~ccM with  the  risk  of  overbidding,  and 
overbidding,  not  only  in  terms  of  consumer  or  capital  goods, 
but  also  in  terms  of  weapons  of  wnr,  and  in  terms  of  pol iticnl 
influen6e.  And  if preferential  agpee~ents and  bi late~al  trade 
deals  result  in  the  gradual  breakdown  of the  international  trade 
structure,  as  each  country  takes  measures  to  protect  itself 
fr•om  the  impl icntions  of  the  ensuin~J  scra•nble  for  oi I,  it  is 
Europe  as  the  largest  trading entity  rn  the  world  which  stands 
to  suffer  most. 
~hat  IS  enerav  ool icv  ahout  ? 
I  have  reviewed  the .economic  and  political  consequences 
but  omitted  perhaps  one  of the  most  important.  The  energy 
crisis  hos  comoletely  trans~ormed the.pol itical  conception  of 
\'-'~wt  energy  p·, I icy  is  e1bout. 
Now  that  energy  pol icy  has  moved  to  the  forefront  of "high" 
diplomacy,  many  of  us  would  be  forgiven  a  growing  confusion.  At 
that  level  of  sophistication  it  seems,  everything  is  I inked  to 
ever'ything  else  and  consequently  nothing  is  resolvable  this 
side  of  Utopia. 
I  do  not  propose  to  spend  the  rest  of  th~ eventng talking 
about  the  future  of  the  Atlantic oil iancc  ilnd  tl\e  A•nericon  forces 
stationed  in  Europe.  But  I  think  it  more  genera·! I y  agreed  that 
energy  pol icy  is  a  necessary  focal  point  as  of  now  for  the 
••• /  fo I I O\" i n  ~1 7
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follo"·ing  is~ues oven  if  they  <lt't'l  rnuch  h'.tder'  tlwn  l:r•adi f.:ionrd 
otH~r·gy  poI 1  cy  : 
(j)  The  nead  is  for  u  fundnnwnt:ul  t•cvision  of  t:he  rules 
govet'n i ng  the  conduct:  of  i nternat: i ona I  tt--~1dc,  to  include 
not;  only  trH·iff  <1ncl  other'  har•rief's  to  i!npopts,  but  olso 
no:1tionally  imposed  Pcstrictions and  re~)ulntions on  the  rinht 
to  export  from  domRsfic  markets,  whether  nppl icd  to  notion-
ally  owned  or  foreign  owned  componies.  Equally  it  must 
re-estnhl ish  the  I imits to  which  privi I edged  relationships 
between  tHo  or  more  countries  or  groups  of  cot1n~ries 
con  go  lvithout  seriously afFecting the  inter•ests  of  Third 
Parties  ; 
(ii)  A  sepat·ate  but  related  1ssue  1s  the  distribution  of the 
wea I th  cre<1tecl  bet\.,rcen  the  pu~chaser·s· of  ra\.J  mater· i a Is, 
predominantly  but  not  exclusively  advAnced  western 
industrial  States,  ond  suppliers  of  rcn.J  m.:1ter>ials,  the 
Third  '·lor· I d 
(iii)  FinFII ly,  there·is the  need  to  rethink  an  effective  code  of 
conduct  governing  the  activities of private  and,  dare  I 
say  it,  publ 1c  concerns  whose  activities vitally affect 
the  nat i ana I  i ntercst;. 
None  of these  are  very  new  problems  as  even  the  most  cursory 
kno,.,l ed9e  of  hi story te I Is  us,  1-,ut  the  energy  cr is  i s  has  served 
to  b r· i n 9  the""  a I I  i n to  the  f o  1~ c f r· on  t  of  i n t ern  n  t  i on n I  d i p I o rna c y 
a~  one  and  ~he  same  ~ime, 
Truditionol  influences  anrl  rel.1tions  are  fluctuating,  ncH 
I inks  of  power  arc  becoming  cstabl ished  het\.Jeen  States,  concepts 
which,  previously  did  not  count  on  the  international  scene  are 
becoming  powerful,  even  overhearing  . 
••• /European  public  optnton 8
EuPop(~•l11  puhl ic  opinion  1s  fully conscious,  bel iev(~,  of 
these  upho.:1v<tl s  ond  of  the  ohscncc  or  Eut'ope  (IS  (ltl  effect: j vn 
n c t or·  i n  U  10  n c '"  d  P n m  a  1-1 l1  i c h  i s  n o  \o.l  h c i n n  p I C1 y  e d  o u {: • 
I  bnl icvc  {:hn{:  the  European  Communi f.:y  rnust  r·.:!act  CJgninst 
t h i s  n n d  rn D k  (~  h  c a t' cl  t h e  v o 1 c: c  o f  a  2 50  -111 i I I i o n  ::; tt~  o n g  c o rn rn u n i t y  • 
let us  begin  by  setting  out  the  types  of  poI 1 cy  avo i I c1b I e 
at the  bPoudest  level  - a  pol icy  r-esponse  rnc:~y  be  expected to 
have  tHo  basic  aims  : 
(a')  :.J"~nl'lgin~J  purposefully  our  dependance  on  differ•cnt  sources 
of  cner·gy  i 
(b~  Attempting  to  ch<H1ge  the  cxtepnal  conditions  of  supply. 
Let  me  deal  fiPst  with  our  extern~!  canditions  of  supply. 
Pol icics  must  incluJ~ 
- the  search  for  a  new  modus  vivendi  with  the  oi 1-producino  ----'-·----
countJ~ies anrl  1-1ith  our  impoPtant  competitive  rivals amongst 
.the  consuming  countries  ; 
-a re-evaluation  of  the  future  role  of the  oi I  majors  and  the 
feasibi I ity  and  effectiveness  of  national  alternatives  ; 
-a revle\-1  of  the  develo;."~ed  \</arid's  future  relationships  \-lith 
those  countPies  in  the  developing  world  not  fortunate  enough 
to  possess  o i I 
- a  r e v 1 e \"  o f  t he  o p p o r t u n i t  i e s  f o r  t h  c  f u r the  r~  9 e o sw il  ph i c a l 
divcr~sificntion  of  Eurooe's  depencl<mcc,  pel"hAps  hy  the  incr·eascc 
use  of  ol tcr·nat i ve  sources  of  energy  such  as  coa I, 
••• /Outside  energy  pol icy 9
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Oui;~>iclo  tHW1'9Y  policy  rlB  sucft,  hut;:·closely  1'(~1.-.tcd,  IB  thn 
need to  Find  !W i tab I o  rnecl1c1n i Hnls  for·  the  ol'ck!r·l y  abscwbt ion  of 
revenues  ~)cne.--uted  by  Lhe  OPF:':C  st.'ltcs  in  \vorld  tPudc. 
Tho  CotnmiRsion  hr:HI  nlreody  proposed  co-opcPntion  I.Jith  the 
o i 1-con  sum i n~1  count ric  s,  an  cl  bcbvecn  them  f1nd  the  o i I -produ  CGI' s 
rnnjol"  oi I  companies,  back  tn  Oci:obeP  1)72. 
For  the  Commission,  tl1is  co-operation  should  be  based  uoon 
the  fo! lowing  four  princiolcs 
(Cl'  the  existc'ncc  of  n  Eurooei'ln  Corwnunity  of  interest  '"hose 
specific  char~acter  should  be  rc~spected,  as  Europe  \vi II 
respect  the  interests of  others  ;  hePe,  I et  :nc  just  rcrn i nd 
you  ho1v  different  the  tr•ading  cir~curnstonces of  \•/estern 
E  u r o  !=> e ,  ft b o v e  a I I  i n  the  H or I d  o i I  rna r  !~ e t ,  .a P e  from  t h o s e 
of the  u.~.  ; 
(b)  a  t'ccognition  of  the  I ikely·  effects  of  national  policies  .  . 
on  other•  countr.ies.  There  must  be  a  public  recognition 
t h at  a I I  pub I i c  p o I i c y  i n  e n e r g y  doe s ,  an d  '" i I I  i n  f u t u r e , 
t.:1ke  account  of  the  essential  interests of  other  consuning 
countrie~.  Here  let  me  remind  you  of the  part  U.S.  i'Ylport 
pol icy  and  the  U.S ..  taxation  pol icy  for  oi I  majors  have 
played  rn  the  origins  of  the  present  crisis. 
(c)  A  commitment  to  the  future  of the third world  and  to  the 
need  to  ensure  that their  development  is  not  further 
obstructed but  t'<.~tl-wr  enhanced  by  the  C~ct ions  of the  rnaJor 
industrial  consuming  nettions  ; 
(d'  no  opposition  to  the  legitimate  interests  a~d etspirations 
of  the  oi !-exporting countries  . 
.... /Obviously,  as this - l 0  .. 
Ohviou~d~·,  <Is  f:hi~;  sl:<ll;e"H~nl:  of  ~wincit)les  ~=r<J\'.JS  cl•.:!i11~, 
t h  0 I'  ~1  \v i I I  h n  d i F r  e I' c n c 0  s  i n  c Ill p h ''  <.; i s '  0 c c i1 s i () 11<1 I I y  c v c n  0 r 
ott i t:udc.  I t  m  u s t  b c  "h u t'  h o p e  <l n d  e >; fH~ c 1: CJ  t i o n  t h  n t  a I I 
concoi'nod  \vi  II  moku  .:1  rnnjor  nffor-t  to  concenf;p,,tc  on  dcv\dopin~J 
i:ho!';c  (JI'<~ns  Hhei'Q  i nto1~est  is  he I d  1  n  comnton,  1-.Jh  i I e  respecting 
the  position  of  othc~rs  1vhere  intepests  seern  to  diverge. 
Those  divet'90ncies  exisi:  1vil:hin  thc·Cornrn.mity,  as  well 
ns  hetween  the  Community  and  of:heP  mnjOI'  consuming  nations 
such  AS  the.~  lJ, S. •\.  ond  Japon  ""  the  Wosh i ngton  Confer.ence  '1ade 
tlwt  clenr  for'  all  to  see.  "' 
But  these  divergencies  should  not  be  overdramatised.  They 
concern  essentially  questions  of  procedure  and  the  ool itic<tl 
impact:  cd-:  the  sl:yle  of  doing  things.  On  such  fundamental 
1 ssucs  as  the  exch<H1ge  of  i nfot'r:wt i o.n  beb,reen  consumers,  co-
ord i ne1t i n~J  their  rcsear•ch  into  a I ter·ne1t i ve  enersrY  sources  to  o i I, 
lwrrnonising  attitudes  to1v<H'ds  the  mix  of  fuels  in  the  ener~gy 
b<tlcH\Ce,  eve.n  on  the  reallocation  of  oi I  in· times  of crisis, 
consensus  is  not  too  far  away. 
Differences  over  the  style  of  doing  things  went  beyond 
energy  pol icy  as  such  and  included  the  conduct  of  Atlantic 
AI  I iancc  :  that  became  immediately  obvious.  Less  obvious,  but 
already  present,  were  differences  between  the  J.S.  and  the 
Conl'nun i ty  over  the  conduct  of  Cornmun i ty'  s  reI at  i onsh ips  with 
the  Arab  Stn tcs,  on  h'horn  she  is  so  dependant.  No"''  these  two 
problems  arc  out  1n  the  open. 
I  think  it  is  both  unwt sc  and  indeed  \vrong  to  oopose 
Atlantic  sol idaPity  and  Community  solidarity as nlternatives 
to  chose  between,even  if  immediately  after the  Wnsl1ington 
Conference,  m<1ny  thought  that  1,ray.  For  it  is  becoTii ng  npoarent 
••• /that there  is  no  necessary ~  1 l  .. 
thnt:  t!\•:r•e ·, s  no  nocessor·y  conrl ict:  behvnen  the  \.,op!<,  of  the 
co.,.. o P d i n  <l t  i n D  :w o up  $ e t  up  by  {; h  c:d.:  C  ,~ n r  n I'  en c e  n n d  t; h c  w  o t' '' 
of  thn  1\ine  thu•nselvcs.  Tho  nction  of  the  co-ordinoting 
Ol'oup.  in  r·cfer·Ping  such  irnport:ant  issues  1:o  the  O'ECD  ns: 
(i)  cncr~w cons(H'v<:d: ion  an<:.~  demond  restr•u i nt  ; 
(i i)  t.lccc I ct'nt i ng  the  dcv~  I Of)mcht  of  a I ter-nflt i ve  t~nepgy 
sour•ces  to  o i I 
(iii) re-allocation  of oil  rn  times  of  Ct'tsrs,. 
has  great I y  t'<Hluced  the  potentia I  aren  of conflict.  We  may 
hope  that  in  the  next  few  months  other topics,  such  as  energy 
R & D and  the  future  role  of the  oi I  companres,  mny  also  find 
theit'  way  there. 
And  I  firmly  believe  that the  ar~as of  agreement  beb.Jeen 
Europe  and  the  U.S.A.  greatly  outweigh  the  areas  of  disagreement 
\"hi ch  certa.i n  observers  have  chosen  to  hi ghl i ght.  ~·le  do  not 
forget  that  the  Americans  should  find  it easier to  escape  fr•o!n 
this energy  crrsrs than  us.  They  have  their  01vn  important 
reserves  of  energy  resources,  whether  actuai ly or  potentially 
i ~  use,  and  the  great  a_<iv<lntage  of  having  the  PO\.Jcr  to  ta!<e 
decisions  reflecting their enormous  econom1c  and  political 
ca!:laoi I itics. 
Thus  Europe  has  every  interest  1n  good  relationships 
with  A~erica,  whose  presence  on  the  international  oi I  scene 
is after alI  so  decisive,  if only  one  thinks of the  exploration 
effort  for  new  reserves,  or  of  measures  to  reduce  consurnption, 
which,  for  a  country  of  America's  impor-tance,  could  be  truly 
sit~nificant. 
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Sut  '''r.~  Eur·op._1rli1S  lll<l)'  nlso  hope  fop  n  nt'o\vlllU  llncf,!t'-
s t tlli d i n D  0 f  t IH1  d i r r  e ,~ e n c c s  i ll  t h  (J  i n t c I' c :c-d; s  () F  c 0 11  g u rn e r 
11 n t i 0 n g  ,  b (' c <l u s 0  0 r  {; h  (! i I.  ViH' y i n 9  e c 0 n ()'II i c:  (l n d  h i s I; 0 I' i c il I 
cir•ctlf:.t;;t;,,nc·~~-,.  For·  ohvious  r>ctrsons  l:lv:?  Corwuunity  feels  th,11: 
step~.;  to,~<'lf•cls  l111  effective  ciialoguc  1vith  tho  .\r•nh  pr•oducers 
.of  oil,  ,,•ho  Sll~-,ply  sorne  75  ·~&of  our•  oii  i111por•b,;,  ore  both 
Pight  {lf1d  C's~a:nt:i,ll,  The  Oommunif:y's  int:er'<.~sts  dici:ote that 
ther•e  should  be  ~uch  <.1  dinlogu~  <tnd,<~t  an  CclPiy  dote. 
Let  •ne  tut•n  m.;uy  no1.,r  fr•orn  i:hese  muddy  \voters,  to  an .area 
more  tr·  <'l d i t i on zd  I y  t h c  con  c e r n  o F  en  e r g y  p o I i c y ,  t IHHl  of  rna n  i'l g i n g 
pur·posefu! I y  our•  dcpendCJnce  on  different  sources  of  energy. 
'd h  ·1 t  ~< i n d  o f  p o I i c i <.:! s  r s  the  E  u rope  c1 n  Com rn ll n i t y  de  v e I o p i n 9 
here  7 
It  is  cle<H'  i.::hat  the  stt~atcgy  proposed  must  stress security 
more  than  ever  ;  both  rn  terms  of  the  velum<.:!  of  su~ply and  the 
price at  \,•hich  it can  be  mnde  avai !able.  At  the  same  time,  it 
must  not  conpromise  the  long  terrn objective'of  making 
avai loble  to  our  economies  once  ag<'lin  cheap  and  <'lbundunt  sunpl ies 
of  enerfiy,  in  acceptable  environmental  conditions.  It  must  be 
flexible  enough  to  reflect  changing  circumstances  in  the  world 
energy  markets  and  compatible  with  internc1l  economic  objectives 
and  external  relations. 
Because  of  the  rigidity of the  energy  supply  si:ruci:ure, 
any  pol icy  to effectively  manage  the  fuels  used,  which  1s  more 
than  tinkering  with  the  margins  of  trends,  must  have  a  long 
ter·m  out I oo~<.  'de  see  for  Europe,  by  the  yea  ro  2000,  an  energy 
structure  hased  essentially  on  two  elements  - nuclear  enerqv 
for  electricity generation,  gas  generation,  and  direct  industr>i~l 
applications,  and  qas- whether  natur·al  or  manufactur·ed.  By 
the  year  ~i)JJ,  our  depend<:lnce  on  coal  and  oi I  could  be  reduced 
••• /to  20%  of  our  energy 13
t:o  20  ·;  (>f  otH'  enur'nY  nueds,  coPtP•ll'cd  l;o  F;onw  8?.  % nt  rwesent. 
T  0  (I c h i u v  (~  t: h i !J  0 h j  (1 G (; i v e I  t:lw  r j' I' s t  sd; e !.Hi  Ill u s t  b c  t t) !< e n 
bct:\-JcH.~n  no1"  •HHI  1.98!)  t:o  t•ostt•uctur"c  supply  i.HHl  to  ndapt  dc:nond,  so 
thut  th~~  erHH'Di(~s  pt~oduced  c<ln  hn  nbsor•bed  I'C:<tdi ly  in  th·~  fot'lll 
in  1vh i ell  !;hey  ul~c  nwdo  ovn i I nb I c, 
13ut  these  sl:eps  rnust  he  consistent  Hith  the  sccupity 
'  .  . 
objective ·in this period.  Those  Pl"oposed  ure  des i gncd  to 
Peduco  ft•orn  61  :'&  i:o  some  43  :-~  th! tota I  of  imported  eneP~W  1 n 
consurnpt ion.  ,\ n d  by  d i v or' s i f i c n t  i on  g  ~..~ o graph i c a I I y  a n d  bet  ween 
fossi I  fuels,  gpcatcr  security  sti I I  may  be  o~tAina~le than 
the  .:1bove  ;--eduction  sug9ests,  taken  at  fnce  vnl ue. 
An  esscnti<)l  elernent  of this policy  must  be  the  restraint 
of  dcr'lclnd  by  cncourogi ng  the  more  efficient  use  of  energy, 
s i nce 1  at  the  rnar"'~J in,  increased  ener"'gy  consurnpt ion  \oJi  II  ul most 
' 
cct"'t<'l in I y  mc<"n  i ncr•cased  o i I  i rr1ports. 
Seconrll y,  \·!e  must  ensure  the  speedy  but  effect i vc 
exploitation. of  such  economic  reserves  of hydrocurbons  ns  the 
Com~unity  itself possesses.  In  particular,  care  must  be  taken 
to  direct  national  gMs  into  its  premtum  uses. 
Thir-dly,  we  intend to  diversify  our  sources  of  imported 
fuels,  principally  by  exploring  the  possibi I ity of  greater 
recourse  to  impoPted  coal. 
To  imple~ent this  pol icy,  the  Com~ission proposed  a  widc-
rnnglng  redefinition  of  the  relationships  beh.reen  the  nubl rc 
authot  ..  itir~s  cllld  the  energy  industry,  in  pnrticulor  those 
con  c c t' n e d  lv i t h  t he  t run sport  ,  r c f  i n i n g  an  cl  d i s t r i b u t  i on  of  o i I 
and  oil  nroducts. 
The  object i vc  is  to  estu~)  I ish  a  code  of  conduct  for  the 
industry.  The  puhl ic  authorities  wi  I I  rnonitor  the  bchavious 
of  tho  i ndustt--y  nnd  ,.,;  I I.  helve  tho  mc<~ns  of  i ntcrvcnt ion  '"hen 
necessary. 
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The  Counc i I  or  the  Eut'Of)Cfll)  Co·n::tun it  j OS  IHH'>  n I t•n<Hiy 
i.H~opt~.lHi  o  r'u I <.1  t'U(Jll it' inn  o i I  corn!HHI i es  to  notiFy the.  mcrnbt~r 
~tol.:cs  nnrl  Conr•ninsion  of'  tiH~ir  impor·t  pr·o~lt'u:tl'nes  one  yeo!'  in 
ndvnnce.  This  •nust  ultirtVlh~ly  he  r•nconcil~"!d  1vith  ony  ~ventunl 
Hupply  pl<1n  csf:ohl ished  by  the  Corn•nunii:y. 
s i !ll i I fn' I y ,  i n v e s t rn c n t  ' p r  0 9 r' u  n1 me s  0 r e  a I I' en d  y  n 0 t i f i c d 
nnd  "'i I I  hove  to  be  reI oted  to  the  str·otegy  odopted. 
F~ u I c s  to  t'  e d c f i n 0  the  i n f o r· rna t  i on  o  corn p a n y  m  u s-t  sup  p I y 
fl n d  to  est  <1 b I i s h  a  p P i c e  r· c 9 i rn e  o r e  a I so  under~  <i c t  i v c  con s i d c-
So  it c.:1n  be  seen  that  1vhut  is- be ins  pr~oposcd  i's  a  very 
a  c t  i v e  en  e r 9 y  p o I i c y ,  1-1 h o s e  i m  p I c me n t a t  i on  ·  H i I I  r e q u r r e  the 
puh I i c  seci:ot'  to  i nvo I ve  i tse If  in  every  aspect' of  the  ba I unce 
of  supply  und  demand  to  ensure  its  success.  In  the  process  He  may 
h ope  t h a t  p r o SJP e s s  '" i I  I  fl I so  be  m  a de  on  t h o s e  m  u c h  '" i de r ,  an d 
more  lon9-standing  )ssues  which  the  energy prisis made  so  pressing. 